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i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the Maryland “county” income tax violate the
dormant Commerce Clause by discouraging cross-border
commerce in favor of in-state commerce?
(2) If the Maryland “county” income tax violates the
dormant Commerce Clause, does the Constitution require
Maryland to fully credit the taxes of other states against
its “county” tax?
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BRIEF OF MICHAEL S. KNOLL AND RUTH
MASON AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
AFFIRMANCE
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are tax professors who, based on their expertise
in law and economics, conclude that the Maryland personal
income tax regime, specifically the Maryland “county” tax,
violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discouraging
interstate commerce, but that a credit is not the only
possible remedy for the breach.
Michael S. Knoll is Deputy Dean and Theodore
Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School; Professor of Real Estate, The Wharton School;
Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University
of Pennsylvania. Much of Professor Knoll’s recent
research focuses on the connections between taxation and
competitiveness.
Ruth Mason is Hunton & Williams Professor of
Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. Most
of her academic work focuses on the meaning of tax
discrimination in various legal contexts, including U.S.
constitutional law, tax treaties, and European Union law.

1. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or
in part and no entity or person, aside from amici curiae and their
counsel, made any monetary contribution toward the preparation
or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for all parties have
consented to this fi ling in letters on fi le with the Clerk’s office.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The internal consistency test reveals that Maryland
applies systematically higher “county” taxes to interstate
commerce than to in-state commerce.
Economic analysis of Maryland’s tax regime—
including its taxes on inbound, outbound, and domestic
activities—confirms what the internal consistency
test suggests, namely, that the Maryland “county”
tax discourages interstate commerce. Specifically, the
Maryland tax regime discourages Maryland residents
from earning income outside of Maryland, and it
simultaneously discourages nonresidents from earning
income in Maryland. Maryland alone causes this
distortion; the distortion does not depend on the taxes
imposed by any other state.
Petitioner’s argument that Maryland’s outbound tax
regime should be upheld because it is facially neutral
when compared to Maryland’s domestic tax requires the
Court to ignore Maryland’s inbound tax on nonresidents.
Ignoring relevant parts of a state’s tax regime obscures
the overall effect of that regime on interstate commerce.
Although crediting other states’ taxes would cure
Maryland’s dormant Commerce Clause violation, other
practical and legitimate alternatives for curing the
violation exist. Maryland, not the courts, should decide
how to cure the constitutional infi rmity in Maryland’s
tax regime.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Maryland’s Income Tax Regime Discourages
Interstate Commerce
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Prevents
States from Encouraging In-state Commerce
at the Expense of Interstate Commerce

The dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution
“is the doctrine that the Commerce Clause, by its own
force and without national legislation, puts it into the
power of the Court to place limits on state authority.”
Felix Frankfurter, the Commerce Clause under Marshall,
Taney & Waite, 18 (1937). Underlying the Commerce
Clause is the framers’ “conviction that in order to succeed
the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among
the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles
of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 41 U.S. 322, 32526 (1979). Accordingly, “[o]ur [economic] system, fostered
by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation.
. . .” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
539 (1949). As interpreted by this Court, the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from using its tax
system to “place[] burdens on the flow of commerce across
its borders that commerce wholly within those borders
would not bear.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
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B. Ma r yla nd’s Ta x R eg ime is I nt er na lly
Inconsistent
The internal consistency test makes clear that
Maryland overburdens, and hence discourages, interstate
commerce as compared to purely in-state commerce.
Acknowledging the importance of state tax sovereignty,
this Court developed the internal consistency test as
a standard for when state taxes violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Under the test,
[i]nternal consistency is preserved when the
imposition of a tax identical to the one in
question by every other State would add no
burden to interstate commerce that intrastate
commerce would not also bear. This test asks
nothing about the degree of economic reality
reflected by the tax, but simply looks to the
structure of the tax at issue to see whether
its identical application by every state in the
Union would place interstate commerce at a
disadvantage as compared with commerce
intrastate.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 185.
Maryland formally divides its individual income tax
into a “state” portion with a maximum rate of 4.75%, and
a “county” portion with rates ranging from 1.25% to 3.2%.
Md. Code Ann., Tax-General (T.G.) §§ 10-102, 10-103(a)
(1). Maryland allows taxes paid to other states to fully
offset the “state” portion of the tax, but it disallows any
credit against the “county” tax. T.G. § 10-703(a). Since
the substance of this dispute concerns only the “county”
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tax, we will analyze only the “county” tax. 2 Ignoring the
uncontested “state” portion of the tax, the Maryland tax
regime contains the following elements:
For residents:
1.

On income earned in Maryland, “county” tax
of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of
residence (domestic tax) T.G. § 10-103(a)(1)

2.

On income earned in other states, “county” tax
of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of
residence, against which and there is no credit
for other states’ taxes (outbound tax) T.G. §§ 10103(a)(1), 10-703

For nonresidents,
3.

On income earned in Maryland, “county” tax
(i.e., Special Non-Resident Tax (SNRT)) of 1.25%
(inbound tax) T.G. § 10-106.1(a). 3

2. The formal division by Maryland of its tax into “state” and
“county” taxes has no effect on constitutional analysis. See, e.g.,
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (striking down a
municipal license tax on business solicitors for violating the dormant
Commerce Clause); see also Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury, 29 A.3d
475, 492 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Maryland’s “county” income
taxes were state taxes for constitutional law purposes).
3. Just as it taxes residents, Maryland subjects nonresidents
with Maryland-source income to the 4.75% “state” portion of
the Maryland individual income tax, but we ignore the “state”
portion of the tax for purposes of this analysis. See T.G. § 10105(d). In lieu of the SNRT, Maryland subjects nonresidents who
receive compensation for employment in Maryland to the “county”

6
4.

On income earned in other states, no tax

The Wynnes resided in Howard County, where the
“county” tax rate was 3.2%, so the Wynnes paid “county”
tax of 3.2% on their domestic and outbound income. Figure
1 schematically represents the Maryland “county” tax
regime for Howard county.
Figure 1. Maryland “County” Tax Regime
M ARYLAND
RESIDENT

RESIDENT OF
A NOTHER STATE

ACTIVITY IN
A NOTHER STATE

Outbound Tax
3.2%

N/A

ACTIVITY IN
M ARYLAND

Domestic Tax
3.2%

Inbound Tax
1.25%

The internal consistency test directs us to assume
that every state enacts the same tax regime as Maryland,
and then the test asks whether, under such hypothetical
harmonization, interstate commerce suffers a greater
burden than does in-state commerce. Figure 2 shows
how income would be taxed if every state (represented
here by Delaware) adopted the Maryland “county” tax
as employed in Howard County:

tax rates ranging from 1.25% to 3.2%. See T.G. § 10-103(a)(4).
Nonresidents with Maryland income from sources other than
employment pay the SNRT, which Maryland sets equal to the
lowest “county” tax rate, 1.25%.
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Figure 2. Maryland Tax under
Internal Consistency Test4
M ARYLAND
RESIDENT

DELAWARE
RESIDENT

ACTIVITY IN
DELAWARE

4.45% 4

3.2%

ACTIVITY IN
M ARYLAND

3.2%

4.45%

Figure 2 shows that the Maryland “county” tax
is internally inconsistent because under hypothetical
harmonization in-state income would be taxed at 3.2%,
whereas interstate income would be taxed at 4.45%.
The shaded quadrants in Figure 2 represent interstate
income, comprising Maryland income earned by Delaware
residents and Delaware income earned by Maryland
residents. In contrast, the unshaded quadrants represent
in-state income, comprised of Maryland income earned
by Maryland residents and Delaware income earned by
Delaware residents.

4. Delaware, employing a tax regime identical to Maryland’s,
would impose a Special Non-Resident Tax (SNRT) of 1.25% on
taxpayers, like the Wynnes, who reside in Maryland but earn
income in Delaware. Maryland would not credit the Delaware
SNRT against its own 3.2% residence-based “county” tax. The
Delaware source-based SNRT tax (or “county tax”) plus the
Maryland residence-based “county” tax yields a total, sourceand-residence tax rate of 4.45%.
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Maryland fails the internal consistency test regardless
of the county analyzed. 5 Also, Maryland fails the test
regardless of whether we consider the state’s tax system
in its entirety—by examining both the “state” and the
“county” tax together—or if we consider the “county” tax
separately.6 This is so because the Maryland “county” tax
rate for interstate income is 1.25% higher than its “county”
tax rate for purely in-state income.7 Because “a law [is]
discriminatory if it taxes a transaction or incident more
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs
entirely within the State,” Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,
516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996), the Maryland Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that the Maryland tax regime violates
the dormant Commerce Clause. Pet. Br. App. 22.
5. If, for example, we apply the internal consistency test
to the lowest Maryland “county” tax rate of 1.25%, then in-state
income is always taxed at 1.25%, whereas interstate income is
always taxed at 2.5%. Maryland’s “county” tax rate on crossborder income is always 1.25% higher than the “county” tax rate
on domestic income.
6. Although the Maryland “state” tax passes the internal
consistency test because it credits the taxes of other states, the
“state” tax does not fi x the internal inconsistency in the “county”
tax.
7. As a theoretical matter, we could attribute this difference
in tax rates to any of three features of Maryland’s tax regime. We
could attribute it to: (1) Maryland imposing a tax that is too low on
its residents’ in-state income, (2) Maryland charging a tax that is
too high on residents’ out-of-state income (for example, because
it fails to credit other states’ source taxes taxes), or (3) Maryland
charging a tax that is too high on nonresidents’ Maryland-source
income. As we discuss later, the indeterminacy of the origin of
Maryland’s restraint on interstate commerce leads to multiple
possible ways that Maryland could cure its constitutional violation.
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The United States objects that the court below found
that Maryland violated internal consistency only because
the Maryland court improperly considered Maryland’s
1.25% tax on nonresidents (the SNRT). U.S. Br. 24. The
United States argues that “Respondents are not subject to
that tax, have not challenged it, and suffer no injury from
it.” U.S. Br. 24. This argument misses the point that the
dormant Commerce Clause protects interstate commerce,
not people. Moreover, the leading treatise on state taxation
explains that “the internal consistency test does not
require that taxpayers demonstrate that they have actually
suffered injury from the challenged tax, but only that the
hypothetical application of the challenged tax by other
states would subject them to a more onerous tax burden
than that shouldered by taxpayers engaged in intrastate
commerce.” J. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation, ¶ 4.16[1]
[b] (3d ed. 2014). Finally, as shown below, the SNRT in fact
harms Respondents because, in addition to discouraging
nonresidents from conducting business in Maryland, the
SNRT simultaneously discourages Maryland residents,
including the Wynnes, from conducting business outside
Maryland. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (holding that
a state’s intangibles tax violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because it discouraged residents from investing
in out-of-state companies).
C.

Economic Analysis Confirms That Maryland’s
Tax Regime Prefers In-State To Interstate
Commerce

Economic analysis shows that Maryland violates
the dormant Commerce Clause because the Maryland
“county” tax distorts interstate competition. Specifically,
the Maryland “county” tax encourages Maryland
residents to earn income in Maryland rather than in other
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states, and it simultaneously also encourages nonresidents
to earn income outside Maryland, rather than within
Maryland. Moreover, we show that applying the internal
consistency test to state taxes generates the same results
as does economic analysis. Because economic analysis
and the internal consistency test produce the same
result, the internal consistency test is a good heuristic
for evaluating whether a state’s tax system violates the
dormant Commerce Clause.
Whereas states apply corporate taxes using formula
apportionment, states apply individual income taxes on a
source and residence basis. Evaluating the impact of state
individual income taxes on interstate commerce requires
consideration of both source and residence taxes because
states may discourage interstate commerce through their
source taxes, their residence taxes, or a combination of
both taxes. Thus, although Petitioner urges the Court to
ignore Maryland’s tax treatment of inbound commerce
(Pet. Br. 34), determining whether a tax system is neutral
between in-state and interstate commerce requires (as
described further below) comparing how a state taxes its
residents’ purely in-state income with how it taxes both
outbound and inbound economic activities.
Each state can tax three kinds of income:
(1) domestic income, which is in-state income earned
by residents,
(2) outbound income, which is out-of-state income
earned by residents, and
(3) inbound income, which is in-state income earned
by nonresidents.
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States generally lack jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause to tax the income that nonresidents earn in other
states. To avoid distorting interstate competition between
residents of different states, a taxing state has the
freedom to set the tax rates on two of those three kinds
of income, but having set the fi rst two rates, the third rate
is algebraically determined by the fi rst two.
The economic analysis is straight-forward. The share
of income that a taxpayer retains after paying tax is called
a retention rate. Figure 3 provides, for each kind of income
taxable by Maryland, retention rates for Maryland and
non-Maryland (proxied by Delaware) taxpayers after
paying Maryland tax. Thus, Figure 3 provides the share
of earnings retained after-Maryland-tax.
Figure 3.
Retention Rates on Income Taxable by Maryland
M ARYLAND
RESIDENT

DELAWARE
RESIDENT

ACTIVITY IN
DELAWARE

Outbound Income
1-To

1

ACTIVITY IN
M ARYLAND

Domestic Income Inbound Income
1-Td
1-Ti

The retention rate for a Maryland resident on an
investment in Maryland is 1-Td , where Td is Maryland’s
tax on its residents’ in-state income (i.e., Maryland’s
domestic tax). Likewise, the retention rate for a Maryland
resident on an investment in Delaware is 1-To, where To
is Maryland’s tax on residents’ out-of-state income (i.e.,
Maryland’s outbound tax).
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The retention rate for a Delaware resident an
investment in Maryland is 1-Ti, where Ti is Maryland’s
tax on nonresidents’ Maryland-source income (i.e.,
Maryland’s inbound tax). Since Maryland does not tax
nonresidents’ out-of-state income, a Delaware resident’s
after-Maryland-tax retention rate on an investment in
Maryland equals 1.
Because investors allocate capital across investments
in different taxing jurisdictions based upon relative
retention ratios (i.e., comparisons of retention ratios), 8
8. In an environment without taxes, the major result of
capital asset pricing models (CAPM) is that all investors end up
holding the full universe of available risky assets in the same
proportion as those assets are available in the market. Investors
might vary the amount of riskless debt and risky assets they
hold, and of course the total amount invested in risky assets will
differ depending upon the size of one’s investment portfolio and
attitude towards risk, but everyone will hold the same portfolio
of risky assets, differing only in the size of the portfolio, but not
in the relative portion of the portfolio (of risky assets) invested in
each asset. The risky portfolio of assets held by each taxpayer is
called the market portfolio because it is composed of a pro-rata
portion of all available (risky) assets.
The after-tax capital asset pricing model (after-tax CAPM)
describes how taxes affect the manner in which investors allocate
their investment capital across assets in an environment with
differentially taxed assets and taxpayers. The main insight from
after-tax CAPM is that the intensity of an investor’s demand for an
asset is determined not by a simple comparison of how an investor
is taxed on that asset relative to how other investors are taxed on
that same asset. Instead, the intensity of an investor’s demand for
an asset is determined by how she is taxed on that asset relative
to how she is taxed on the market portfolio as compared to how
other investors are taxed on that asset relative to how they are

13
we need to calculate the retention ratios of Maryland
and Delaware residents on investments in Maryland.
A Maryland resident’s retention ratio is the share of
income remaining when she invests in Maryland relative
to what remains when she invests outside Maryland (in
Delaware). Thus, a Maryland resident’s retention ratio on
an investment in Maryland is (1-Td)/(1-To). In contrast, a
Delaware resident’s retention ratio is the share of income
she retains when she invests in Maryland relative to
what she retains when she invests in Delaware. Thus a
Delaware resident’s retention ratio on an investment in
Maryland is (1-Ti)/1, or 1-Ti .

taxed on the market portfolio. The central result that emerges
from after-tax CAPM is that an investor will tend to invest
more intensively in an asset when she is taxed lightly on an asset
relative to how the same investor is taxed on the market portfolio
as compared to how other investors are taxed on the asset relative
to how they are taxed on the market portfolio. The converse also
holds, so an investor will shy away from an asset that bears higher
tax relative to the market portfolio for the investor compared to
other investors’ relative tax for that asset. See Michael Brennan,
Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy, 23
Nat’l Tax J. 417 (1970); Roger H. Gordon & David F. Bradford,
Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and
Dividends, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 109 (1980).
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In order for taxes not to distort interstate commerce,
the retention ratios across Maryland and Delaware must
be the same for residents of Maryland and residents of
Delaware.9 This requirement can be written as:
1 – Td

=

1 – To

1 – Ti

(1)

Equation 1 describes the condition for income taxes
not to distort interstate competition in terms of retention
rates, which are the share of pre-tax income taxpayers
retain after paying Maryland tax. That presentation
highlights the mechanism—individual investment choice—
whereby tax affects interstate competition. It is also
possible to describe the non-distortion condition in terms
of tax rates, thereby providing states with straightforward
guidelines for avoiding distorting interstate competition.
After a few simple arithmetic operations, Equation 1 can
be rewritten as:
Td

=

To + Ti – (To x Ti).

(2)

That is, the tax rate applied to the domestic income
of residents must equal the sum of the tax rates paid by
9. How taxation affects competition between residents
of different states depends upon relative retention ratios. If
the parties’ ratios are the same (even though their tax rates
are different), then taxation will not affect where either party
invests. If, however, their ratios are different, then taxation will
distort competition. Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, 121 Yale L. J. 1014, 1060-74 (2012).
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residents on out-of-state income and by nonresidents on
domestic income less the product of those two rates.10 If a
state’s tax rates do not satisfy Equation 2, its tax system
distorts interstate competition.11 Notice that this equation
does not specify any of the rates; rather it specifies the
relationship that the rates must maintain with respect to
each other. A state may set its tax rates as high or low
as it wants. The dormant Commerce Clause, however,
prevents a state from setting its tax on domestic income
independently from its tax on interstate (inbound and
outbound) income.
In addition to describing this result mathematically, in
academic work amici describe the result more intuitively
as requiring that all taxes be assessed on either a uniform
source or a uniform residence basis.12 A source tax is
uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same
base13 to both residents’ and nonresidents’ income from the
state. A residence tax is uniform if it applies at the same
rate and on the same base to residents’ in-state and out10. Expressed slightly differently, the tax rate Maryland
applies to its residents’ Maryland-source income must be the
same as if Maryland fi rst applied the rate applicable to residents’
out-of-state income and then applied to the remaining income the
rate applicable to nonresidents’ Maryland-source income.
11. Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, Waiting for Perseus, 67
Tax L. Rev. 375, 436-41 (2014) (providing an algebraic derivation
of non-distortion conditions).
12. Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra,
at 1060-74 (describing uniformity requirements for taxes not to
distort competition).
13. “Tax base” refers to the rules for calculating taxable
income.
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of-state income. And if a state taxes on both a source and
residence basis, it must apply both source and residence
taxes to its residents’ in-state income.
Courts interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause
need not engage in the kind of economic analysis we
presented here. Instead, the principle that underlies
the dormant Commerce Clause—that states should not
distort competition between their residents and residents
of other states—generates simple rules of thumb. One
rule of thumb, represented by Equation 1, is that a state
must set tax rates so that retention ratios for residents
and nonresidents are equal across jurisdictions. A second
rule of thumb, represented by Equation 2, is that the tax
rate on residents’ in-state income must equal the combined
tax rate on the in-state income of nonresidents and on the
out-of-state income of residents.14 A third rule of thumb
is that state taxes must be uniform.
Still another rule of thumb is the Court’s internal
consistency test. Taxes that fail the kind of economic
analysis we just conducted also will fail the internal
consistency test. This equivalence arises because the
hypothetical harmonization performed under the internal
consistency test has the effect of applying to residents that
earn out-of-state income and to nonresidents that earn instate income both the state’s treatment of nonresidents’
14. The fi rst two rules of thumb, retention ratios and tax
rates, apply when the only issue in dispute is tax rates, not tax
bases. The uniformity rule and the internal consistency test apply
to cases involving base or rate challenges, or both. All four rules
of thumb require adjustment when the residence state provides
a credit for foreign taxes. See, e.g., Mason & Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, supra, at 1074.
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in-state income and the state’s treatment of residents’
out-of-state income. The internal consistency test thus
calculates the combined tax rate from assessing both of
those taxes and then compares the combined tax to the
rate the state imposes on residents’ domestic income. If the
rates are the same, then there is no violation. If the rates
are different, then taxes distort competition.15 Thus, the
internal consistency test asks the same question as does
economics in determining whether a state’s tax system
distorts competition between residents of different states.
Regardless of whether we frame the inquiry for
identifying tax systems that discourage interstate
commerce algebraically using formulas, intuitively using
uniformity rules, or schematically using the internal
consistency test, the result is the same: Maryland’s
“county” tax discourages interstate commerce. Maryland
taxes domestic income earned by Maryland residents
at a lower rate (3.2%) than it taxes cross-border income
15. Thus, not only in substance, but in form as well the
internal consistency test is equivalent to the tax rate rule as
described in Equation 2. The left side of Equation 2, the tax rate
on domestic residents’ domestic income, is the same value as in
the unshaded (i.e., in-state income) quadrants of Figure 2. The
right side of Equation 2, the total tax rate from applying the
state’s taxes on inbound and outbound commerce, is the same
as the values in the shaded (i.e., interstate income) quadrants of
Figure 2. Because the internal consistency test asks whether the
tax rates in all four quadrants are equal, it is essentially asking
whether Equation 2 holds. The internal consistency test is also
equivalent to the rule of thumb that retention ratios should be
equal across residents of different states because that rule, which
was mathematically expressed in Equation 1, was the source from
which Equation 2 was derived. Finally, non-uniform tax laws fail
the internal consistency test because a system with non-uniform
laws violates Equation 2.
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(4.45%, comprised of the 3.2% outbound tax plus the 1.25%
inbound tax).16
Maryland’s higher taxes on interstate income than
domestic income generate distortions that affect both
residents and nonresidents. Specifically, Maryland
discourages residents from engaging in out-of-state
commerce and, at the same time, it discourages
nonresidents from engaging in commerce in Maryland
(including raising capital from Maryland residents). These
distortions stem from Maryland alone; they will persist
even if no other state imposes a tax.17
D.

The Internal Consistency Test Is An Appropriate
and Helpful Heuristic for Revealing Whether
a State’s Tax System Violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause

Petitioner, the United States, and other amici argue
that this Court should not apply the internal consistency
test because it is clear that under the Due Process Clause
Maryland has the power to tax the Wynnes’ worldwide
income and hence, in their view, there is no issue of fair
apportionment. Pet. Br. 37, U.S. Br. 20, Multistate Tax
Comm’n Br. 7. But possession by a state of jurisdiction
to tax a person under the Due Process Clause does not
16. Because Maryland does not appear to allow for the
purpose of calculating “county” taxable income a deduction for
taxes paid to the source state, the tax on cross-border income is
4.45%, not 4.41%.
17. For more on the two-directional distortion caused
by non-uniform taxation, see Mason & Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, supra, at 1051-71.

19
immunize the state from the requirement that it exercise
that jurisdiction consistently with other constitutional
provisions, including the dormant Commerce Clause.
Both the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination
requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause aim
to ensure that a state does not discourage interstate
commerce relative to in-state commerce. We take
no position on whether Maryland violates the fair
apportionment prong or the nondiscrimination prong of
the Complete Auto test. Complete Auto. Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).18 Rather, we conclude that
Maryland violates the dormant Commerce Clause by
discouraging interstate commerce relative to in-state
commerce. Because the internal consistency test provides
the same result as economic analysis in evaluating
whether a state tax discourages interstate commerce
compared to in-state commerce (which is the central issue
in dormant Commerce Clause cases), the test is useful in
18. We regard failure to apportion taxes fairly to be a
subset of tax discrimination as we defi ne it in our academic work.
See Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra, at
1060-72. Cf. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination
Against International Commerce, 54 Tax L. Rev. 131, 154 (2001)
(“[a]lthough not explicitly framed as a nondiscrimination
requirement, the [tax] treaty requirement of either a credit or
exemption could thus be considered such a requirement”); Michael
J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and
the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.
J. 1186, 1240-1 (2006) (“the Supreme Court has invalidated state
tax laws favoring in-state products, producers, and production,”
but that last kind of case is rare because “the U.S. states’ use
of formulary apportionment. . . reduces the role of residence
taxation because the allocation factors generally relate to source
or consumption”).
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both apportionment and discrimination cases. Indeed,
the Court has used internal consistency to evaluate both
discrimination and apportionment cases. See, e.g., Armco,
Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (applying internal
consistency test in a discrimination case).
In arguing against applying dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, including the internal consistency test,
to individual income taxation of resident taxpayers, the
United States notes that corporate taxes operate on
“different principles” from individual income taxes. U.S.
Br. 29-30. Nevertheless, the relevant question under
the dormant Commerce Clause is the same as applied
to individual or corporate taxes, namely, does the state
discourage interstate commerce compared to in-state
commerce? We see no reason why the Court should not
continue to apply the logical rigor and clarity of the
internal consistency test to income tax cases.
Petitioner argues that it “make[s] little sense” to
apply the internal consistency test to individual income
taxes. Pet. Br. 38. Accordingly, we list some of the
virtues of using the internal consistency test to evaluate
whether individual income taxes discourage cross-border
commerce.19
First, the dormant Commerce Clause operates as
a restraint on state taxation of individuals as well as
corporations, and therefore, the same standards should
19. This analysis draws on our academic work. See Ruth
Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal
Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1277, 1284-1300, 1309-1319
(2008); Georg Kofler & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European
“Switch in Time”?, 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 63, 83-94 (2007).
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apply to both. The failure to apply the internal consistency
test (or one of the equivalent tests above) to individual
taxes would create a large gap in the dormant Commerce
Clause and provide states with a roadmap for restricting
interstate commerce and dividing up the national market
into a series of state markets. If the Court upholds
Maryland’s “county” tax, what would prevent Maryland
from relabeling its “state” tax a “county” tax and
completely eliminating credits for other states’ taxes? In
that case, under hypothetical harmonization, the Wynnes
and their Delaware counterparts would pay tax at 7.95%
on in-state income and at 15.9% on cross-border income.
Such a tax would surely discourage interstate commerce
in favor of in-state commerce.
Second, the internal consistency test makes it easier
for courts to analyze state taxes under the dormant
Commerce Clause because it allows courts to evaluate
a single state’s tax regime on its own terms, without
the need to consider any other state’s taxes. Because a
court considers only one state’s law under the internal
consistency test, a question never arises as to which state
generated the interstate tax disadvantage. As this Court
has said, the constitutionality of one state’s law should not
“depend on the shifting complexities of the tax laws of 49
other States.” Armco, Inc., 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984).
Third, the internal consistency test helps avoid judicial
error. As long as they do not discriminate, states retain
autonomy to set their tax rates. As a result, in the real
world, adoption by other states of higher or lower tax rates
than that of the challenged state may lead to false positives
or false negatives, respectively, when courts attempt to
discern discrimination by comparing the amount of tax
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paid on interstate commerce to the amount of tax paid
on purely in-state commerce. Because tax rates vary,
the payment of higher, lower, or equal taxes on crossborder and in-state commerce does not dispose of the
discrimination question.
Fourth, the internal consistency test helps courts
distinguish tax discrimination from nondiscriminatory
cases of double taxation. This Court has held that
nondiscriminatory instances of double taxation, such as
those arising from disparities in states’ income tax bases,
do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978). Because
the interaction of disparate, but nondiscriminatory,
tax regimes may result in nondiscriminatory double
or “overlapping” taxation, the absence or presence of
unrelieved double taxation cannot serve as a reliable
guide to whether a state’s tax regime is constitutionally
infi rm. 20 Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 268 (approving
Iowa’s single-factor apportionment formula even though
20. For example, no constitutional principle tells us who
ought to be taxable on alimony, the payer or recipient. States may
adopt nondiscriminatory, albeit disparate, tax policies for taxing
alimony. Imagine State A taxes alimony to the recipient, and
offers a deduction to the payer, while State B denies a deduction
to the payer, but excludes the alimony from the income of the
recipient. These regimes are different, but they both have the
effect of taxing the alimony only once between the payer and the
recipient, and neither discriminates. Nevertheless, a disadvantage
arises when a State B resident pays alimony to a State A recipient
because the A resident must include the alimony, but the B
resident gets no deduction. Conversely, a double benefit would
accrue to a payment from State A to State B. These advantages
and disadvantages disappear under the internal consistency
test’s harmony assumption, which enables a court to attribute the
interstate differences to disparity, not discrimination.
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it could result in “some overlap” with Illinois’ threefactor formula). The internal consistency test eliminates
disparities in states’ tax bases by hypothetically assuming
that all states use the challenged state’s tax rules. As a
result, any double taxation that remains after application
of the harmony assumption by definition cannot arise from
tax base disparities, and therefore it must originate in the
challenged state’s tax law.
Fifth, Petitioner concedes that “[a] state tax based
on residency might be subject to internal consistency
analysis if the state applied the tax so that it had an
impact on taxpayers who actually lived in other states.”
Pet. Br. 39, n.15. While Petitioner sees no such impact
stemming from the challenged Maryland tax regime, the
internal consistency test allows us to quickly understand
the impact of a state’s tax regime upon both residents and
nonresidents. The two shaded regions of Figure 2 show
both the impact of the Maryland regime on Maryland
residents with out-of-state income (like the Wynnes),
the impact of the Maryland regime on nonresidents
with Maryland income. The internal consistency test
reveals what Petitioner misses: the Maryland tax regime
disadvantages both outbound and inbound economic
activities relative to the purely domestic activities of
Maryland residents.
For these reasons, the internal consistency test
represents a useful heuristic to isolate the impact of
Maryland’s tax law on interstate commerce. 21 That
21. See Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency”
Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint
on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 178 (1988) (arguing
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Maryland’s tax regime fails the internal consistency test
shows that Maryland overreaches. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
514 U.S. at 169 (“A failure of internal consistency shows as
a matter of law that a State is attempting to take more than
its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction”).
Economic analysis confi rms that Maryland’s tax regime
distorts competition between residents and nonresidents
for investments within and without Maryland.
E. Tax Regimes That Discriminate Against
Interstate Commerce May Contain Elements
That Appear To Be Facially Neutral When
Viewed In Isolation
The internal consistency test shows that whereas
Maryland taxes residents’ domestic income once, it taxes
interstate income both coming and going. A state taxes
natural persons on three kinds of income: domestic,
outbound, and inbound. To get an accurate view of how
a state taxes interstate commerce requires comparing
how the state taxes domestic income to how it taxes both
inbound and outbound income. In contrast, Petitioner’s
disaggregated view of the Maryland tax regime, under
which courts compare a state’s domestic tax to only one
of its inbound tax or its outbound tax, allows Maryland to
impede interstate commerce with impunity.
Petitioner argues that the Maryland tax does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it is
that internal consistency can be seen as a “proxy for the fair
apportionment criterion”). Id. at 178-88 (arguing that cases struck
down for failure of internal consistence instead could have been
struck down on fair apportionment grounds). Source and residence
rules are the individual-income-tax analog to apportionment
formulas in unitary business taxes.
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facially neutral; Maryland taxes residents’ in-state and
out-of-state income at the same “county” rate, namely
3.2%. Pet. Br. 35-36. But that neutrality holds only when
we isolate Maryland’s tax on outbound transactions and
compare it to Maryland’s tax on domestic transactions.
As the internal consistency test vividly demonstrates, this
so-called neutrality depends on ignoring Maryland’s tax
on inbound transactions.
Examining state taxes on just two out of the three
kinds of income produces misleading results. For example,
in a recent case, Comptroller v. Frey, 29 A.3d. 475 (Md.
2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1796 (2012), the Maryland
Court of Appeals considered whether Maryland’s
inbound tax (the SNRT) discriminated against interstate
commerce. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals
concluded that the inbound tax was facially discriminatory
because it applied only to nonresidents, the Maryland
court nevertheless held that the inbound tax did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause because it was no higher
than Maryland’s domestic tax. 22
Thus, in Frey, at the urging of the Maryland
Comptroller, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered
whether Maryland discriminated against only inbound
commerce. Now, just five years later in Wynne, Petitioner
asks the Supreme Court to evaluate the question of
22. Frey involved a Delaware resident who was a partner
in a limited liability partnership that earned some of its income
in Maryland. The Maryland-source income was subject to both
the “state” and “county” portions of Maryland’s income tax on
nonresidents. The Court of Appeals concluded that the “county”
tax on nonresidents, the SNRT, “is a facially discriminatory tax.”
Frey, 29 A.3d. at 497.
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whether Maryland discriminates against only outbound
commerce.
Combining Frey with Wynne shows the problem. In
Frey, Petitioner succeeded in urging the Maryland Court
of Appeals to compare Maryland’s 1.25% tax on inbound
income with its 3.2% tax on domestic income. Frey, 29
A.3d at 496, 505. And now, in Wynne, Petitioner asks
the Supreme Court to compare Maryland’s 3.2% tax on
outbound income with the same 3.2% tax on domestic
income. By double-counting the domestic tax, Petitioner
was able to construct: (1) in Frey a facially preferentialto-outsiders comparison of domestic and inbound taxes
(3.2% versus 1.25%) and (2) in Wynne a facially neutral
comparison of domestic and outbound taxes ( 3.2% versus
3.2%). 23
Double-counting the domestic tax obscures that
whereas Maryland taxes residents’ domestic income once,
it taxes interstate commerce coming and going. 24 The
combined Maryland taxes on interstate commerce (i.e.,
the inbound tax plus the outbound tax) sum to 4.45%,
23. Our analysis uses the highest “county” tax rate of 3.2%,
but the actual “county” rate depends on the taxpayer’s county of
residence and ranges from 1.25% to 3.2%. The “county” tax rate
on nonresidents (SNRT) is set equal to the lowest “county” rate,
which is 1.25%. The analysis here holds, no matter which “county”
rate we consider.
24. To avoid discouraging interstate commerce, Maryland
could, for example, impose both taxes—the residence tax and
the source tax—on residents’ Maryland income. In that case,
Maryland would have uniform taxes—a uniform source tax of
1.25% and a uniform residence tax of 3.2%. But there are other
alternatives for Maryland to cure its violation, as we discuss below.
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thus exceeding the Maryland tax on residents’ domestic
income of 3.2%. If all states adopted similar regimes,
interstate commerce would always face more tax than
domestic commerce.
Understanding the economic impact of a state’s tax
on interstate commerce requires analysis of how the state
taxes both inbound and outbound commerce. Courts must
compare a state’s treatment of inbound and outbound
commerce to the state’s treatment of purely domestic
commerce. Isolating and comparing the tax on only two
out of three types of income provides a partial analysis
that may obscure discrimination, whereas analyzing all
relevant parts of a state’s tax regime comports with the
underlying economics as well as the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause precedent. The Court regularly looks
to disparate parts of a state’s tax code to evaluate socalled compensatory tax schemes, under which a “facially
discriminatory tax survives strict scrutiny if it is the
‘rough equivalent of an identifi able and ‘substantially
similar’ tax on intrastate commerce.’” Frey, 29 A.3d at
494 (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 103 (1994)). This case involves a facially neutral
tax that has a discriminatory impact when seen in light of
a substantially similar tax on inbound commerce.
Failure to adopt a comprehensive view of a state’s
tax regime—by considering how the state taxes all of
domestic, inbound, and outbound commerce—raises
the risk that states will eviscerate the protection that
the dormant Commerce Clause provides for interstate
commerce by embedding discriminatory tax provisions
in disparate parts of their tax regimes. Whether used as
heuristics antecedent to economic analysis or as standards
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in and of themselves, the rules of thumb described
above, including the internal consistency test, prevent
disaggregation of the state tax regime into inbound-only
and outbound-only elements. As a result, they prevent
the kind of incomplete analysis urged by Petitioner both
in the instant case and in Frey.
II. Maryland Can Cure Its Commerce Clause Violation
In Several Ways, None Of Which Depends On The
Taxes Collected By Any Other State
The economic analysis above leads to the conclusion
that the Maryland tax regime violates the dormant
Commerce Clause because it discourages interstate
commerce compared to in-state commerce. Although the
Supreme Court should find the Maryland “county” tax
unconstitutional, there are several ways for Maryland to
cure the infi rmity, and Maryland, not the courts, should
choose the cure.
Although economic analysis shows that Maryland’s tax
regime discourages Maryland residents from engaging
in commerce outside Maryland while simultaneously
discouraging nonresidents from engaging in commerce
inside Maryland, economic analysis does not and cannot
tell us whether Maryland discriminates on either an
outbound basis or an inbound basis. Economic analysis
(and the internal consistency test) tell us that a state tax
regime that does not meet the equivalence in Equation 2
distorts competition between residents and nonresidents.
However, economic analysis does not specify which term
in that equation, that is, which tax rate, should change to
make the two sides of the equation balance. For example,
we cannot conclusively attribute the distortion caused by
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Maryland’s tax regime exclusively to its outbound taxation
in the form of its failure to credit other states’ taxes; nor
can we conclusively trace the distortion exclusively to
Maryland’s inbound taxation in the form of the SNRT.
If the Supreme Court affi rms the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals, then Maryland has several
options. It can:
(1) raise its domestic tax, Td ,
(2) lower its outbound tax, To, including by crediting
other states’ taxes against its “county” tax or by exempting
residents’ income earned in other states,
(3) lower its tax on inbound activities, Ti , or
(4) any combination of (1) through (3) that satisfies
the tax rate rule given in Equation 2 or equivalently is
internally consistent.
Although crediting other states’ taxes generally will
cure a state’s internal inconsistence, 25 because Maryland
25. J. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation, supra, ¶ 4.16[1]
[b] (approving the lower court’s decision in Wynne). A common
approach would be for Maryland to credit other states’ taxes up
to the amount of its own tax on outbound investments. Cf. Warren,
supra, at 153 (describing the commitment in tax treaties to either a
foreign tax credit or exemption as aiming to “reduce impediments
to international commerce”). However, Maryland could provide a
smaller credit and still satisfy internal consistency. For example,
Maryland could increase its foreign tax credit by the amount of
the SNRT of 1.25%. By increasing the tax credit from 4.75% to
6%, Maryland effectively makes the creditable portion of its tax
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can cure its Commerce Clause violation in a number of
ways, and the Constitution provides no guidance for which
way is best, discretion lies with Maryland. 26 The Supreme
Court need not, and should not, choose a particular option
for Maryland. Rather, it is up to Maryland to decide how
to cure its violation.
Indeed, upon a motion for reconsideration, the
Maryland Court of Appeals clarified that,
A state may avoid discrimination against
interstate commerce by providing a tax credit,
or some other method of apportionment, to avoid
discriminating against interstate commerce in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Comptroller interprets a footnote in our
earlier opinion to hold that a state must provide
system a 6% worldwide tax with a full credit coupled with a 6% tax
on Maryland-source income of nonresidents. That leaves the rest
of the Maryland tax as a uniform, 1.95% residence tax without a
credit on Maryland residents’ domestic and out-of-state income.
For a discussion of the requirements for state taxes not to distort
interstate commerce when the taxing state is offering a credit
for taxes paid to other states (which differ from those when the
state is not offering a credit), see Mason & Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, supra, at 1063-64, 1072-74.
26. That is, the Constitution gives no answer to the question
whether (for Howard County’s 3.2% tax rate) Maryland should,
for example: (1) increase Domestic Quadrant tax to 3.2 + 1.25 –
(3.2% x 1.25%) = 4.41%, (2) reduce the Outbound Quadrant tax
either by eliminating that tax or by allowing a full credit against
other states’ taxes to reduce Maryland’s 3.2% tax on outbound
activities, or (3) eliminate the 1.25% Inbound Quadrant tax. The
choice of how to equalize Equation 2 remains the sovereign choice
of Maryland.
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a tax credit. Slip Op. at pp. 28-29 n.26. While
the footnote might have been worded more
elegantly, it referred primarily to the method
used by the Legislature in the Maryland income
tax; we did not mean to preclude other methods
that might be utilized in other contexts.
Pet. Br. App. 51-52.
Moreover, affirming the lower court’s decision does not
spontaneously generate a need to resolve which state—
Maryland or the state where the Wynnes earned their
income—has priority to tax that income. Affi rmation
that Maryland’s individual income tax regime violates
the dormant Commerce Clause does not compel full
creditability as the sole remedy, and therefore, contrary
to Petitioner’s suggestion, it does not amount to a
requirement that “the Maryland tax must give way in
favor of taxes paid to other states.” Pet. Br. 31.
Nor would affi rming the lower court bar Maryland
from taxing its own residents’ out-of-state income.
Petitioner argues that a requirement for Maryland to
credit other state’s taxes would mean that Maryland “is
effectively barred from taxing its residents’ out-of-state
income to the extent that another state has already taxed
that income.” Pet. Br. 13. This would, in Petitioner’s
terms, create an “all-take-and no-give arrangement”
between Maryland and its residents with out-of-state
income because those residents would receive government
services from Maryland without having to pay tax. Pet.
Br. 24. But, consistently with the dormant Commerce
Clause, Maryland can tax nonresidents’ out-of-state
income at whatever rate it chooses. What Maryland
cannot do, however, is set that rate independently of its
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rates on domestic and inbound commerce. Maryland’s
tax on interstate commerce can be no higher than its
tax on domestic commerce. As a result, raising its tax on
outbound commerce may, under certain circumstances,
necessitate raising its tax rate on domestic commerce.
That may be politically painful, but the alternative
currently in force in Maryland is unconstitutional.
As our analysis makes clear, and contrary to
Petitioner’s suggestions, none of the options available to
Maryland to cure its dormant Commerce Clause violation
depends in any way on the actions taken by any other
state. Pet. Br. 34, 41.
III. Conclusion
The crucial question under the dormant Commerce
Clause is whether a state tax policy “establishes an
economic barrier against competition” or an “unreasonable
clog upon the mobility of commerce.” Moorman Mfg.
Co., 437 U.S. at 287-88 (Powell, J., dissenting). As the
discussion above makes clear:
The Maryland “county” tax discourages interstate
commerce in favor of in-state commerce. The tax regime
adversely affects both residents with out-of-state income
and nonresidents with in-state income. Thus, the Maryland
“county” tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause and
so the Court should hold.
Economic analysis and the internal consistency test
yield the same results for whether a state tax distorts
commerce because both methods test for the same rate
equivalence. The internal consistency test therefore
represents a simple way for the Court to determine
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whether or not a state’s tax favors in-state commerce
over interstate commerce. The test also reduces the risk
that parts of a state tax regime, considered in isolation,
will appear to pass constitutional muster even though
combining the challenged rule with other parts of the
state’s tax regime reveals systematic discouragement of
interstate commerce.
Maryland can cure the constitutional infi rmity in its
“county” tax in multiple ways. Accordingly, the Court
should affi rm the decision below and send the case back to
Maryland so that the Maryland legislature can decide how
to render the tax consistent with the Commerce Clause.
The Court need not, and should not, require Maryland to
provide a tax credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions
up to the amount of the “county” tax.
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